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8.1 Introduction
The world suﬀered three major ﬁnancial crises in the last ten years,
namely, the European Monetary System (EMS) crisis in 1992–1993, the
Mexican crisis in 1994–1995 (which spread to a number of South Ameri-
can countries), and the Asian crisis in 1997–1998. Economists usually be-
lieve these crises were the results of weak economic fundamentals, for ex-
amples, declining foreign reserve, increasing foreign debt, capital account
and current account deﬁcits, ﬁscal deﬁcit, and so on.
Obviously, a current account deﬁcit can be a very important factor be-
cause, other things being equal, it increases foreign debt, decreases foreign
reserves, and weakens conﬁdence in the exchange rate of the domestic
currency. Almost all countries that suﬀered ﬁnancial crises had faced ris-
ing current account deﬁcits before the crises occurred. So such deﬁcits are
widely regarded as an important factor of ﬁnancial crises.
International trade links play an important role in the so-called conta-
gious eﬀect, that is, a crisis in one country causes a new crisis in another
country with relatively good fundamentals. Glick and Rose (1999) pro-
vided some analysis of the relationship between trade and contagion, while
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on International Trade
Zihui Ma and Leonard K. ChengForbes (2001) went further to construct some statistics measuring the im-
portance of trade linkages in transmitting crises.
Because most economists agree that international trade is one of the im-
portant factors in explaining ﬁnancial crises, it seems natural and logical
to ask the reverse question: what are the eﬀects of ﬁnancial crises on inter-
national trade? Surprisingly, little research on this subject has been done.
Perhaps the reason is that the answer appears to be obvious. Conventional
wisdom would predict that a ﬁnancial crisis, by bringing about a recession
in the macroeconomy, would lead to a drop in imports. Exports, however,
may rise because of both a decline in domestic demand and a devaluation
of the domestic currency. A weakening or collapse of the ﬁnancial system,
in particular the banking system, however, might weaken the country’s ex-
port capability. So the aggregate eﬀects of a ﬁnancial crisis on the macro-
economy are unclear. This paper tries to ascertain whether the ambiguity
can be resolved empirically.
We divide all the past ﬁnancial crises into two types: banking crises and
currency crises. These two diﬀerent types of crises had diﬀerent attributes
and diﬀerent eﬀects on international trade. This paper begins by analyzing
theoretically the eﬀects of banking and currency crises on international
trade. Then it uses bilateral trade data, macroeconomic data, and geo-
graphic data to test the theoretical predictions. Overall, the empirical re-
sults provide support for the theoretical predictions.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it provides a
theoretical framework for understanding the impact of ﬁnancial crises on
international trade and the channels of crises transmission through trade.
Second, it estimates the eﬀects of banking crises and currency crises on im-
ports and exports. The estimated results can be used to predict the impact
of ﬁnancial crises on trade, thus providing useful information for risk man-
agement to policymakers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 8.2 reviews
previous works on the relationship between international trade and ﬁnan-
cial crisis. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 analyze the eﬀects of banking crises and of
currency crises on trade, respectively. Section 8.5 describes the data and
methods used to estimate the eﬀects of these crises. Section 8.6 reports the
results of empirical estimation and statistical testing. Section 8.7 con-
cludes.
8.2 Literature Review: Trade and Financial Crises
Economists pay attention to the role played by trade in ﬁnancial crises
for two reasons. First, trade imbalance has been shown to be one of the im-
portant factors that trigger ﬁnancial crises. Current deﬁcits may decrease
foreign reserves. As Krugman (1979) pointed out, a currency crisis is more
likely to happen in an economy that does not have enough foreign reserves.
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aﬀected country to others despite the latter’s relatively good fundamentals.
In explaining such contagion eﬀects, economists have tried to identify the
channels through which contagion was spread. As trade is the most obvi-
ous economic linkage between countries, much research has been devoted
to this connection. While the importance of trade imbalance in triggering
crises is widely accepted, there is no agreement on the importance of trade
in transmitting ﬁnancial crises.
Eichengreen and Rose (1999) used a binary-probit model to test whether
bilateral trade linkages transmitted crises between industrial countries be-
tween 1959 and 1993. They found that the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis
occurring in a country increased signiﬁcantly if the country had high bi-
lateral trade linkages with countries in crises. They concluded that trade
was an important factor. Glick and Rose (1999) conducted a similar anal-
ysis with more countries between 1971 and 1997 and obtained a similar re-
sult. Forbes (2000) used a company’s stock market data to study the impor-
tance of trade in ﬁnancial crises transmission, and his result also showed
that trade played an important role.
However, other papers have provided diﬀerent answers to the problem.
For instance, Baig and Goldfajn (1998) thought that trade linkage was un-
important in the East Asian Crisis because the direct bilateral trade vol-
umes between these economies were very small. Masson (1998), analyzing
the Mexican crisis and the Asian crisis, obtained similar results.
All the papers that analyzed the relationship between trade and ﬁnancial
crises ignored the reverse question: how did ﬁnancial crises aﬀect interna-
tional trade? We argue that the eﬀects of ﬁnancial crises on trade are a pre-
condition for discussing whether trade transmits crises. If ﬁnancial crises
do not aﬀect countries’ imports and exports at all, how can ﬁnancial crises
be transmitted through the trade channel? So before we analyze the im-
portance of trade in transmitting ﬁnancial crises, we need to clarify the
eﬀects of ﬁnancial crises on international trade. As pointed out previously,
little work has been done on this topic to date. It seems there is a belief that
ﬁnancial crises only aﬀect countries’ imports and exports through changes
in the exchange rates. Because the eﬀects of exchange rates have already
been thoroughly analyzed before, it may seem that there is no need to study
the question. However, this view may not be correct.
A devaluation of a national currency will increase the volume of exports
and reduce the volume of imports. Classic international trade theory shows
that a devaluation improves the trade balance if the Marshall-Lerner con-
dition is satisﬁed. Because in a ﬁnancial crisis a country usually experi-
enced a devaluation of its national currency, the same analysis would ap-
ply, that is, the aﬀected countries’ imports will decrease, but their exports
will increase after the crises.
Furthermore, ﬁnancial crises (including currency crises, banking crises,
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Calvo and Reinhart (1999) pointed out that ﬁnancial crises usually caused
capital account reversal (sudden stop) and triggered an economic reces-
sion. Mendoza (2001) showed that in an economy with imperfect credit
markets these sudden stops could be an equilibrium outcome. The eco-
nomic recession reduces not only domestic demand but also total output
and export capability, whereas capital outﬂow forces the country to in-
crease export. Thus, whether exports increase or decrease after ﬁnancial
crises is unclear without further analysis.
Before we analyze how ﬁnancial crises aﬀect the crisis countries’ imports
and exports, let us ﬁrst deﬁne ﬁnancial crises. Eichengreen and Bordo
(2002) have provided deﬁnitions of currency crises and banking crises:
For an episode to qualify as a currency crisis, we must observe a forced
change in parity, abandonment of a pegged exchange rate, or an inter-
national rescue. For an episode to qualify as a banking crisis, we must
observe either bank runs, widespread bank failures and suspension of
convertibility of deposits into currency such that the latter circulates at
a premium relative to deposits (a banking panic), or signiﬁcant banking
sector problems (including but not limited to bank failures) resulting in
the erosion of most or all of banking system collateral that are resolved
by a ﬁscally-underwritten bank restructuring. (15–16)
The above deﬁnitions are adopted in this paper. In the next two sections,
we analyze the eﬀects of banking crises and currency crises on the macro-
economy and trade.
8.3 Impact of Banking Crises
A classical framework of bank runs was developed by Diamond and Dy-
bvig (1983). Let us recapitulate the key elements of their model. Agents are
endowed with goods that can be invested in a long-term project or stored
without costs. The long-term project is proﬁtable but illiquid, that is, if in-
vestors do not liquidate the project before it matures, its return is greater
than the initial investment; however, if the project is liquidated before it
matures, the ﬁre-sale return is less than the initial investment. Each agent
can be impatient or patient with ﬁxed probabilities, but there is no aggre-
gate uncertainty, that is, the total number of impatient agents is ﬁxed and
known by all agents. At the beginning, agents do not know their own types
but must decide if they will invest in the project. After they have invested
(or have decided not to invest), but before the project matures, each agent
realizes his or her own type. Impatient agents must consume immediately,
whereas patient agents do not consume anything until the project matures.
Agents’ types are private information, so even if each agent knows his or
her own type, other people do not know.
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to be patient, then the agent has missed a proﬁtable investment opportu-
nity. On the other hand, if the agent invests in the project but turns out to
be impatient, the agent will have suﬀered a loss. In this case, the agent has
to liquidate the long-term investment before it matures.
Agents can improve their utilities by pooling risk through the creation of
a bank. All agents deposit their goods in the bank. Depending on the num-
ber of impatient agents, the bank sets aside a part of deposits as reserves
and invests the rest in the project. When agents realize their types, impa-
tient agents withdraw their deposits from the bank’s reserves and patient
agents wait for the project to mature. After the project matures, the bank
distributes the return of the project to patient agents. By way of pooling
risk through the bank, impatient agents do not suﬀer ﬁre-sale losses, and
patient agents can enjoy the beneﬁts of the project.
However, there is a problem because agents’ types are private informa-
tion. Patient agents can pretend to be impatient and withdraw their de-
posits before the project matures. Normally, they have no incentive to do
so because withdrawing early decreases their utilities. However, patient
agents may wish to withdraw their deposits if there is panic. When that hap-
pens, the bank’s reserves will not be enough to meet the agents’ demand.
The bank has to liquidate the long-term project before it matures, but it
cannot meet the withdrawal if all patient agents try to withdraw because
the ﬁre-sale return of the project is less than the initial investment. The
result is a bank run, and some agents get nothing back.
The preceding is the classical framework of bank runs. It does not ana-
lyze the eﬀect of bank runs on imports and exports. We extend this model
to feature international trade by making four additional assumptions.
1. We assume that agents belong to two categories: local agents and for-
eign agents. Local agents are endowed with local goods, and foreign agents
are endowed with foreign goods. Both foreign and local agents may be pa-
tient or impatient with the same probability. Both local and foreign goods
can be bought and sold in the international market.
2. The long-term project needs both foreign and local goods as inputs,
and it produces local goods. As the aggregate investment increases, the in-
vestment demand for local and foreign goods also increases. For simplic-
ity, we assume that foreign agents’ deposits are less than the investment de-
mand for the foreign goods. So the bank always has to export some local
goods for the sake of importing foreign goods.
3. Foreign agents only consume foreign goods, and local agents con-
sume both local and foreign goods. The returns that agents receive from the
bank are local goods, so they need to exchange a part or all of the return
for foreign goods in the international market.
4. There are overlapping generations. When the project matures, a new
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their goods in the bank, and the bank invests deposits in a new long-term
project. We assume that the number of local agents is ﬁxed, but the num-
ber of foreign agents depends on the experience of the previous generation.
If no bank run occurs in the previous generation, the number of new for-
eign agents will be the same. Otherwise, the number of new foreign agents
will decrease, that is, capital inﬂow decreases after a bank run.
We can analyze the impact of banking crises on imports and exports un-
der the preceding assumptions. If a bank run occurs before the project ma-
tures, all agents withdraw their deposits. Due to the illiquidity of the proj-
ect, only some of them can get their deposits back. On the average, agents
suﬀer losses. All foreign agents (without a bank run, only impatient foreign
agents) leave the economy bringing with them the withdrawal. After the
banking crisis, capital inﬂow decreases. So banking crises aﬀect interna-
tional trade through three channels.
1. Income channel. If a bank run occurs, the bank has to liquidate the
long-term investment before it matures, and all depositors suﬀer some
losses. With a lower income, local agents’ demand for foreign goods goes
down. Through this channel, both imports and exports decrease during
and after banking crises.
2. Foreign capital ﬂow channel. In the absence of bank runs, patient for-
eign agents withdraw after the project matures, but the withdrawal would
be oﬀset by an inﬂow of new investment made by the next generation of for-
eign agents. However, a bank run causes them to withdraw early and also
reduces new foreign investment in the future. So banking crises can stimu-
late exports during crises but reduce them after crises.
3. Investment demand channel. As aggregate investment decreases, the
input demand for foreign goods drops. So banking crises have negative
longer-term eﬀects on imports through this channel. On the other hand, as
foreign investment decreases, the economy must export more local goods
to import foreign goods as investment input. As a result, banking crises
will simulate exports after crises.
The real world is more complicated than that highlighted in the preced-
ing theoretical framework. For instance, developed countries usually may
be able to defend their banking systems when banking crises occurred, so
net capital outﬂow might not happen. As a second example, some less-
developed countries (e.g., some African countries) are unsuccessful in
attracting a lot of foreign capital, so the impact of capital ﬂow would be in-
signiﬁcant during banking crises. As a third example, several Latin Ameri-
can countries (e.g., Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela) stopped repaying for-
eign debt during debt crises in the 1980s, so the amount of net foreign
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ysis.
8.4 Impact of Currency Crises
Currency crises often occur due to one of two reasons: runaway ﬁscal
deﬁcits or external shocks. We analyze them in turn. As Krugman (1979)
pointed out, if a government cannot control its budget deﬁcit, it has to ﬁ-
nance the deﬁcit by printing money, thus triggering currency depreciation.
The currency crises in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina would be a case in
point.
An external shock (it may be a currency crisis in another country) may
cause the demand for local products to decrease in the international mar-
ket. If the economy’s exchange rate remains unchanged, it must experience
a price deﬂation, which is often a painful process because cutting prices
is diﬃcult, and cutting the civil servants’ salary may be particularly chal-
lenging. During a price deﬂation, ﬁrms usually suﬀer losses while unem-
ployment rises. To minimize the social costs, the government may choose
to give up the ﬁxed exchange rate regime. A case in point would be the ex-
perience of Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Singapore before and during
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. These economies faced competition in their ex-
port market from China, and the devaluation of the Japanese yen in 1996
worsened their trade position further. They discovered that their cost struc-
tures were too high to support their currencies, so they had to give up the
ﬁxed exchange rates despite their relatively good fundamentals. The Thai
government gave up its ﬁxed exchange rate in July 1997, triggering the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis. Even though Hong Kong’s currency board was
maintained, it paid a heavy price in the form of price deﬂation and ﬁscal
deﬁcit.
During a currency crisis, the exchange rate would be more uncertain.
Importers and exporters are exposed to greater exchange rate risk and may
choose to reduce their business to reduce their exposure. As a result, cur-
rency crises may have negative impacts on imports and exports in the short
term.
In the longer term, the market equilibrium is gradually restored. How-
ever, imports and exports may not return to the original level because a cur-
rency crisis can produce persistent impact on imports and exports through
three channels.
1. Income channel. This channel exists if a crisis is triggered by external
shocks. As the demand for local products declines, the consumer’s income
falls. So both imports and exports decline.
2. Substitution eﬀect channel. This channel exists if a crisis triggered by
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sumers tend to increase their consumption of local product and decrease
their demand for foreign goods, so both imports and exports decrease.
3. Wealth channel. Regardless of whether a currency devaluation is
caused by a ﬁscal deﬁcit or an external shock, consumers always suﬀer
wealth losses due to money holdings, forcing consumers to decrease their
consumption. As consumers’ demand for foreign goods decreases, imports
decrease; as their demand for local product decreases, other things being
equal, the economy is able to export more.
If a devaluation is expected, consumers can reduce losses by reducing
their money holdings. They can exchange domestic currency for foreign
currency before the devaluation and then reverse the process after the
devaluation. If the cash-in-advance constraint holds, their consumption
would decrease during the devaluation as they reduce their money holding
in anticipation of the devaluation. As a result, imports decrease and, if the
price elasticity of demand for exports is larger than unity, the value of ex-
ports increases in the short term. After the devaluation, however, consump-
tions may return to the original level. So expected devaluations will have
only short-term impact on imports and exports.
However, according to Eichengreen and Bordo (2002), currency crisis
often occurred when governments abandoned their ﬁxed exchange rates
suddenly. The Mexico crisis was a good example. Before the abandonment
of its ﬁxed exchange rate, the interest rate of the peso was relatively low, and
the market did not predict the devaluation. As Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999, 484) have pointed out, “For currency crises, [real, our own] interest
rates bounce around in the range of 0 to 2 percentage points per month
below the average during periods of tranquility.” In short, most currency
crises were unexpected, and thus the impact on imports and exports
through the wealth channel would be larger than if the crises were ex-
pected.
8.5 Data, Crises, and Estimation Model
Having analyzed in theory the eﬀects of banking crises and currency
crises on foreign trade, let us use real-world data to test the preceding the-
oretical predictions.
The data include bilateral the export value from 1981 to 1998 as con-
tained in the World Trade database; gross domestic product (GDP), popu-
lation, and exchange rate data between 1979 and 1998 as contained in the
International Financial Statistics database; distances, common land bor-
der, the number of the landlocked countries, and the number of the island
countries as contained in Frankel and Rose’s (2002) database. Eichengreen
and Bordo (2002) have provided a list of ﬁnancial crises found in the ma-
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the included countries are suﬃciently representative.
We show the frequency of currency crises and banking crises in ﬁgures
8.1 and 8.2, respectively. There were 128 currency crises between 1980 and
1998. As shown in ﬁgure 8.1, the number of currency crises peaked in 1982,
1986, and 1992, with more than ten crises each year. In 1982, the debt cri-
sis occurred in many Latin American countries, and ﬁve Latin American
countries had currency crises. In addition, six other countries experienced
currency crises due to the high U.S. interest rate. In 1986, there were thir-
teen currency crises in both developed and developing countries, spread-
ing over Asia, Africa, Europe, North and South America. In 1992, many
European countries quit EMS under speculative attacks. In 1997 and 1998,
several Asian countries that had stable exchange rates for a long time, such
as Malaysia and Korea, experienced currency crises, even though the fre-
quency of currency crises was not signiﬁcantly higher than the average
level.
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Table 8.1 Country list and crisis frequency (1980–1998)
Banking Currency  Banking  Currency 
crisis crisis  crisis  crisis 
frequency frequency frequency frequency
Argentina 4 6 Japan 1 0
Australia 1 2 Korea Republic 2 3
Austria 0 0 Malaysia 2 2
Bangladesh 1 2 Mexico 2 6
Belgium-Lux 0 1 The Netherlands 0 1
Brazil 2 3 New Zealand 1 3
Canada 0 2 Nigeria 1 6
Chile 1 2 Norway 1 1
China 0 4 Pakistan 0 5
Colombia 1 0 Paraguay 1 3
Costa Rica 1 1 Peru 1 4
Denmark 1 2 The Philippines 2 5
Ecuador 1 5 Portugal 0 1
Egypt 2 1 Singapore 1 1
Finland 1 3 South Africa 1 7
France 1 1 Spain 0 3
Germany 0 0 Sri Lanka 1 0
Greece 0 2 Sweden 1 1
Hong Kong 2 0 Switzerland 0 0
Iceland 0 2 Thailand 3 2
India 1 2 Turkey 3 4
Indonesia 3 4 United Kingdom 0 2
Ireland 0 2 Uruguay 1 3
Israel 0 0 United States 1 1
Italy 1 2 Venezuela 2 4
Jamaica 0 4 Zimbabwe 1 7According to Eichengreen and Bordo’s (2002) deﬁnition, currency crises
do not always manifest themselves as currency devaluations. For instance,
the Swedish krona did not depreciate in 1992, but Sweden’s central bank
had to rely on an international rescue eﬀort to defend its currency. There-
fore, we regard that as a currency crisis. In contrast, while the Hong Kong
dollar was attacked in 1997 and 1998, there was neither devaluation nor
international rescue. Therefore, we do not classify that as a currency crisis.
We classify currency crises that ended with devaluations as “successful”
currency crises and the others as “unsuccessful” currency crises. Accord-
ing to these deﬁnitions, 113 currency crises were successful, and 15 were
unsuccessful.
There were ﬁfty-three banking crises between 1980 and 1998. From ﬁg-
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Fig. 8.1 Histogram of currency crises: 1980–1998
Fig. 8.2 Histogram of banking crises: 1980–1998ure 8.2 we can see that in 1981, 1987, 1994, and 1998, there were more than
ﬁve crises each year. These peaks of banking crises were close to the peaks
of currency crises.
If a banking crisis and a currency crisis occur in a country in the same
year, we regard that as a “twin crisis.” There were ﬁve twin crises during
1980–1998. This deﬁnition is not perfect because it ignores some cases in
which that banking crisis and currency crisis occurred closely but in sub-
sequent calendar years.
We use bilateral trade data to test the theoretical predictions because we
would like to isolate external eﬀects that vary across countries. For ex-
ample, if a country and its main trading partner fall into ﬁnancial crises at
the same time, the country’s exports and imports are aﬀected by both in-
ternal and external shocks. However, we would not be able to include the
external shock as explanatory variable if we use their aggregated (across
countries) trade data. The use of bilateral trade data allows us to include
the importing and exporting countries’ crisis dummies as explanatory
variables, thus avoiding biases caused by inappropriate use of dummies in
analyzing aggregate trade data.
The gravity model is widely used to estimate bilateral trade value. The
basic idea is that trade between any pair of countries is positively related to
their economic sizes but inversely related to the distance between them.
Some other factors, such as common land border, can also aﬀect bilateral
trade value. This methodology has proven to be successful in explaining
variations in bilateral trade. We extend the gravity model by including cri-
sis variables. The regression equation to be adopted is as follows:
log(exportt,i,e)    log(exportt 1,i,e)    1Xt,i,e    2Yt 1,i,e    3Yt 2,i,e
   4Ct    5Ct 1    6Ct 2   C    t   εt,i,e
where exportt,i,eis exports from country eto country iat time t. As trade re-
lationships take time to build and to break, we allow for the underlying
continuity of trade over time by including log(exportt–1,i,e) as an explana-
tory variable. Xt,i,e is a set of macroeconomic variables that aﬀect trade be-
tween country i and e at time t. Based on the gravity equation framework,
X is taken to include the following variables: igdp, the log of GDP of the
importing country; egdp, the log of GDP of the exporting country; ipop,
the log of the population of importing country; epop, the log of the popu-
lation of exporting country; dis, the log of the distance between importing
and exporting countries; comland, a common land border dummy equal to
1 if the trading countries have a common land border and 0 otherwise;
nland, the number of trading countries being landlocked (i.e., 0, 1 or 2);
nisland, the number of trading countries being islands countries (i.e., 0, 1,
or 2); C is constant term; idevt   log iext – log iext–1, the rate of devaluation
of the importing country’s currency relative to the U.S. dollar, where iext is
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porting country’s currency at time t; edevt   log eext – log eext–1, the rate of
devaluation of the exporting country’s currency relative to the U.S. dollar.
Since a currency devaluation has both short-term and longer-term
eﬀects, the explanatory variables Yt–1,i,e and Yt–2,i,e include the ﬁrst and sec-
ond lag of the devaluation variables, namely, lagidev, lagedev, lag2idev, and
lag2edev.
To capture the possibility of time trends, we also include time t as an ex-
planatory variable.
Ct, Ct–1, and Ct–2 are crisis dummy variables and their ﬁrst and second
lags. Ct includes bit, bet, cit and cet, the banking crisis dummies of the im-
porting and exporting countries and the currency crisis dummies of the im-
porting and exporting countries, respectively.
bit   0 if country i does not fall into a banking crisis at time t;
1 otherwise.
cet   0 if country i does not fall into a currency crisis at time t;
1 otherwise.
We analyze how ﬁnancial crises aﬀected foreign trade over a period of
three consecutive years. The eﬀects on trade during the crisis years are re-
garded as “short term” and the eﬀects on trade one and two years after
crises are regarded as “longer term.” We do not consider lags in excess of
two years because the major crises were not more than three years apart.
For example, the EMS crisis (1992–1993), the Mexican crisis (1994–1995),
and the Asian crisis (1997–1998). Furthermore, as these three clusters of
crises were no more than two years apart, lags in excess of two years would
run into an identiﬁcation problem whether an observed eﬀect was caused
by the current or previous crisis.
8.6 Estimation Results and Statistical Tests
The economic structure of the world economy has changed greatly as it
continues to evolve. As a result, the characteristics of the ﬁnancial crises in
diﬀerent periods varied not only because the aﬀected countries were diﬀer-
ent but also because economic linkages at diﬀerent points in time were diﬀer-
ent. For instance, in the 1980s, the international ﬁnancial market was less de-
veloped and there was relatively little international borrowing by the private
sector. At that time, most ﬁnancial crises occurred in Latin American and
African countries, where much borrowing was by governments. In the 1990s,
the ﬁnancial crises also hit the developed countries and East Asian countries.
In the latter case international borrowing of short-term money was an im-
portant cause of the crises, as there was a rapid expansion of international
lending to the private sector of Asia’s “emerging economies.”
The factors thought to be crucial in causing ﬁnancial crises in diﬀerent
264 Zihui Ma and Leonard K. Chengperiods were diﬀerent. In the 1980s the Latin American crisis countries
were unable to control their ﬁscal deﬁcits and current account deﬁcits.
Their economic fundamentals were regarded as very weak before the crises
broke out. Krugman’s (1979) ﬁrst-generation currency crisis model has
been widely used to explain this kind of crisis. Then came the crises in the
early 1990s that were explained by second-generation models pioneered
by Obstfeld (1996). These models highlight the inconsistency in macro-
economic policy objectives and issues of credibility and commitment. Fi-
nally, third-generation models featuring ﬁnancial fragility, self-fulﬁlling
prophecy, and “contagion” have been developed to explain the occurrence
of currency crisis despite strong macroeconomic performance and absence
of ﬁscal deﬁcits.
The aﬀected countries’ responses to crises were also diﬀerent at diﬀerent
times. For instance, during the Latin America debt crisis in the 1980s, the
governments of many indebted countries decided to suspend the repay-
ment of their foreign debts, but during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997–
1998, only Malaysia attempted to control capital outﬂow.
Because the ﬁnancial crises exhibited diﬀerent properties during the
1980s and 1990s, we divide our sample into two subsamples (1982–1990
and 1991–1998), estimate regression equations separately for each period,
and compare the eﬀects of ﬁnancial crises in diﬀerent periods. Before we
proceed, let us test whether the impact of ﬁnancial crises on trade were the
same before and after 1990. The null hypothesis is
H0: [ 4  5  6]  year  1990   [ 4  5  6]  year  1991,
where [ 4  5  6]  are the coeﬃcients of current, lag, and second-lag cri-
sis dummies. The value of the F-statistics, F[12,41545] is 6.32. That is to
say, H0 is rejected, suggesting that there were structural diﬀerences before
and after 1990.
8.6.1 Gravity Model with Lagged Dependent Variables 
and Rates of Devaluation
Before we examine the impact of ﬁnancial crises, let us check the behav-
ior of the gravity model with a lagged dependent variable and rates of de-
valuation, that is,
log(exportt,i,e)    log(exportt 1,i,e)    1Xt,i,e    2Yt 1,i,e    3Yt 2,i,e
  C    t   εt,i,e,
where Xt,i,e includes igdp, egdp, ipop, epop, dis, comland, nland, and nis-
land. The devaluation variables are either omitted or included.
The estimation results when the devaluation variables are omitted are
reported in the ﬁrst two columns of table 8.2. The model’s ﬁt is relatively
good. In both periods, R2 is greater than 0.93. Most coeﬃcients are signif-
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Table 8.2 Gravity equation without crisis dummies
1982–1990 1991–1998 1982–1990 1991–1998
Lag export 0.87089 0.86802 0.86957 0.86896
(0.00323)∗∗∗ (0.00318)∗∗∗ (0.00323)∗∗∗ (0.00319)∗∗∗
igdp 0.13928 0.11356 0.13255 0.11274
(0.00532)∗∗∗ (0.00478)∗∗∗ (0.00532)∗∗∗ (0.00481)∗∗∗
egdp 0.14958 0.13325 0.15153 0.13073
(0.00576)∗∗∗ (0.00518)∗∗∗ (0.00584)∗∗∗ (0.00523)∗∗∗
ipop –0.02198 –0.00774 –0.01444 –0.00794
(0.00432)∗∗ (0.00365)∗∗ (0.00434)∗∗∗ (0.00371)∗∗
epop –.03737 –0.00831 –0.03899 –.00613













dis –0.13329 –0.11617 –0.12433 –0.11599
(0.00764)∗∗∗ (0.00703)∗∗∗ (0.00765)∗∗∗ (0.00703)∗∗∗
comland 0.04533 0.11118 0.08437 0.10838
(0.03067) (0.02800)∗∗∗ (0.03081)∗∗∗ (0.02813)∗∗∗
nland –0.00637 –0.09191 –0.01318 –0.09007
(0.01469) (0.01320)∗∗∗ (0.01469) (0.01320)∗∗∗
nisland 0.05365 0.03890 0.04458 0.03878
(0.00959)∗∗∗ (0.00870)∗∗∗ (0.00968)∗∗∗ (0.00874)∗∗∗
year 0.01406 –0.01277 0.01496 –0.01265
(0.00202)∗∗∗ (0.00201)∗∗∗ (0.00202)∗∗∗ (0.00206)∗∗∗
Observations 21,500 20,084 21,500 20,084
R2 0.9317 0.9468 0.9326 0.947
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
icant, and their signs are consistent with theoretical predictions of the
gravity model. An unstable result is time trend: it was signiﬁcantly positive
during 1982–1990 but signiﬁcantly negative during 1991–1998. Because
the volume of trade for all countries is expressed in U.S. dollars, the chang-
ing value of the U.S. dollar over time may provide some clues. The value of
the U.S. consumers’ price index (CPI) increased by 41.5 percent during
1982–1990 but by 22.6 percent in 1991–1998. So even if the time trend of
the real value of exports was the same, the time trend of exports measured
in current U.S. dollars could be diﬀerent.Other diﬀerences between the two periods include the coeﬃcients of
ipop, epop, comland, and nland. Although the signs of the coeﬃcients for
these population variables in both periods are negative, the absolute values
decreased signiﬁcantly in the 1990s. The absolute values of the coeﬃcients
of comland and nland in 1991–1998 were higher than those in 1982–1990.
Next, we add the rates of devaluation and their lags, idev, edev, lagidev,
lagedev, lag2idev, and lag2edev, as explanatory variables. The results are
reported in the last two columns of table 8.2.
The signs of all the newly added explanatory variables are identical in
both periods. To understand the eﬀects of devaluation, we draw impulse re-
sponse functions in ﬁgures 8.3 and 8.4 by considering devaluations of 50
percent, or equivalently by setting idev and edev equal to 0.4055.
In ﬁgures 8.3 and 8.4, either in the 1980s or in the 1990s, devaluations
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Fig. 8.3 Impulse response functions induced by devaluation: 1982–1990
Fig. 8.4 Impulse response functions induced by devaluation: 1991–1998had negative impact on imports. However, the impact was short term. Ex-
cept for the eﬀects on GDP, imports almost fully recovered in the second
year after the devaluation. In contrast, the impact of devaluations on ex-
ports was somewhat more complicated. In the year of devaluation, exports
decreased, but a year later, exports rebounded signiﬁcantly, only to de-
crease again in the second year after the devaluation.
The results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. If a devalua-
tion is expected to occur, then consumers reduce their cash holdings to
avoid loss, decreasing consumption, decreasing imports, and increasing
exports in the short term. After the devaluation, consumption rebounds so
imports and exports return to the original level. The decrease in exports in
the devaluation year may be due to the low price elasticity of exports in the
short term, but the result that the longer-term exports are less than the
original level is hard to explain because it would be questionable whether
the price elasticity of demand for exports would remain less than unity two
years after devaluation.
8.6.2 Adding Crisis Dummies
Now let us add ﬁnancial crisis dummies to the regression equation. First,
we include the banking crisis dummy and the currency crisis dummy sepa-
rately. The results are reported in table 8.3.
The ﬁrst two columns of table 8.3 show that the impact of banking crises
was unclear between 1982 and 1990. The short-term eﬀects on imports and
exports were insigniﬁcant, and the longer-term eﬀects were negative but
not always signiﬁcant. The results for 1991–1998 were more signiﬁcant.
Imports decreased signiﬁcantly in all three years. Exports increased in the
crisis years but fell back in the ﬁrst year after banking crisis.
Impulse response functions induced by the banking crisis dummy are
presented in ﬁgures 8.5 and 8.6. We focus on the results for 1991–1998 in
ﬁgure 8.6. The impact on imports not only was negative but also tended to
decrease further.
The last two columns of table 8.3 show the eﬀects of currency crises, and
the impulse response functions induced by the currency crisis dummies are
shown in ﬁgures 8.7 and 8.8. From the table and ﬁgures, we ﬁnd that the
eﬀects on imports in the two periods were very similar. In both periods,
imports decreased in all three years. However, the eﬀects on exports in the
two periods were somewhat diﬀerent. In 1982–1990, there was a signiﬁcant
negative impact of currency crises on exports in the short term (i.e., the co-
eﬃcients of cet and lagcet–1 were signiﬁcantly negative), and the negative
impact was mitigated but not reversed in the second year after crises. In
stark contrast, the eﬀects of currency crises on exports in 1991–1998 were
signiﬁcantly positive in all three years.
When all crisis dummies are included as explanatory variables, the re-
sults are reported in table 8.4. The results for banking crises are very simi-
268 Zihui Ma and Leonard K. ChengTable 8.3 Estimation results with separate crisis dummies
1982–1990 1991–1998 1982–1990 1991–1998
Lag export 0.86976 0.86851 0.86849 0.86890
(0.00323)∗∗∗ (0.00318)∗∗∗ (0.00323)∗∗∗ (0.00319)∗∗∗
igdp 0.13149 0.11327 0.12863 0.10831
(0.00533)∗∗∗ (0.00480)∗∗∗ (0.00538)∗∗∗ (0.00484)∗∗∗
egdp 0.15080 0.13190 0.15098 0.13325
(0.00585)∗∗∗ (0.00522)∗∗∗ (0.00586)∗∗∗ (0.00526)∗∗∗
ipop –0.01478 –0.00371 –0.01154 –0.00109
(0.00434)∗∗∗ (0.00376) (0.00436)∗∗∗ (0.00383)
epop 0.03950 –0.00734 –0.03819 –0.01016
(0.00446)∗∗∗ (0.00378)∗ (0.00447)∗∗∗ (0.00386)∗∗∗
idev –0.18671 –0.06225 –0.16387 –0.07087
(0.01426)∗∗∗ (0.02115)∗∗∗ (0.01501)∗∗∗ (0.02141)∗∗∗
edev –0.04301 –0.06271 –0.03050 –0.05268
(0.01421)∗∗∗ (0.02124)∗∗∗ (0.01494)∗∗ (0.02147)∗∗∗
lagidev –0.05899 –0.01953 –0.05678 –0.02099
(0.01718)∗∗∗ (0.01871) (0.01830)∗∗∗ (0.01927)
lagedev 0.06568 0.05136 0.07026 0.05198
(0.01711)∗∗∗ (0.01877)∗∗∗ (0.01825)∗∗∗ (0.01928)∗∗∗
lag2idev 0.19066 0.08434 0.19057 0.09188
(0.02039)∗∗∗ (0.01346)∗∗∗ (0.02114)∗∗∗ (0.01374)∗∗∗
lag2edev –0.02843 –0.03143 –0.03533 –0.05060

























dis –0.12227 –0.11668 –0.12028 –0.11711
(0.00512)∗∗∗ (0.00702)∗∗∗ (0.00766)∗∗∗ (0.00704)∗∗∗
(continued)lar to those obtained previously when currency crisis dummies were omit-
ted (table 8.3). In 1982–1990, the eﬀects of banking crises were insigniﬁcant
except for the coeﬃcient of lagbit. Figure 8.9shows impulse response func-
tions induced by the banking crisis dummies. In 1991–1998, imports de-
creased and exports increased signiﬁcantly in the short term, and both im-
ports and exports decreased in the longer term. Comparing the impulse
response functions in ﬁgure 8.10 with ﬁgure 8.6, we ﬁnd that after control-
ling for the eﬀects of currency crises, the accumulated impact of banking
crises in the second year after crises was negative.
The results for currency crises are similar to those obtained previously
when banking crisis dummies were omitted. In both periods, imports de-
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Table 8.3 (continued)
1982–1990 1991–1998 1982–1990 1991–1998
comland 0.08925 0.10719 0.08780 0.10574
(0.03083)∗∗∗ (0.02808)∗∗∗ (0.03076)∗∗∗ (0.02811)∗∗∗
nland –0.01821 –0.08939 –0.00716 –0.09212
(0.01477) (0.01317)∗∗∗ (0.01468) (0.01318)∗∗∗
nisland 0.04177 0.04011 0.04648 0.03844
(0.00971)∗∗∗ (0.00874)∗∗∗ (0.00967)∗∗∗ (0.00874)∗∗∗
year 0.01378 –0.01328 0.01224 –0.01330
(0.00204)∗∗∗ (0.00206)∗∗∗ (0.00204)∗∗ (0.00207)∗∗∗
Observations 21,500 20,084 21,500 20,084
R2 0.9327 0.9473 0.9329 0.9472
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Fig. 8.5 Impulse response functions induced by banking crisis (without currency
crisis dummies): 1982–1990Fig. 8.6 Impulse response functions induced by banking crisis (without currency
crisis dummies): 1991–1998
Fig. 8.7 Impulse response functions induced by currency crisis (without banking
crisis dummies): 1982–1990
Fig. 8.8 Impulse response functions induced by currency crisis (without banking
crisis dummies): 1991–1998Table 8.4 Estimation results with both kinds of crisis
1982–1990 1991–1998



























































∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Fig. 8.9 Impulse response functions induced by banking crisis (with currency crisis
dummies): 1982–1990
Fig. 8.10 Impulse response functions induced by banking crisis (with currency cri-
sis dummies): 1991–1998creased in all three years. The impact of currency crises on exports was sig-
niﬁcant except that during the crisis years in 1982–1990. The impulse re-
sponse functions for the currency crisis dummy during the two periods are
given in ﬁgures 8.11 and 8.12, respectively. In 1982–1990, exports de-
creased in the short term and remained below the original level despite a
subsequent recovery. In 1991–1998, the short-term eﬀect on exports was in-
signiﬁcant, and exports exceeded the original level beginning in the ﬁrst
year after currency crises. After controlling the eﬀects of banking crises,
the impact of currency crises on exports was insigniﬁcant during the crisis
years. So the signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient of cet in table 8.3 seems to be
the result of omitting the banking crisis dummies.
We summarize the theoretical predictions and empirical results about
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Fig. 8.11 Impulse response functions induced by currency crisis (with banking cri-
sis dummies): 1982–1990
Fig. 8.12 Impulse response functions induced by currency crisis (with banking cri-
sis dummies): 1991–1998the impact of banking crises and currency crises in tables 8.5 and 8.6, re-
spectively. Because the model includes GDP and devaluation as explana-
tory variables, the eﬀects of the crisis dummies capture the eﬀects of crises
through channels other than economic recession or currency devaluation.
Theoretical analysis predicts that exports increase during banking crises
due to foreign outﬂow, and in the longer term, changes in exports depend
on the aggregate eﬀect through the foreign capital ﬂow channel and the in-
vestment demand channel; imports would decrease due to reduction in in-
vestment demand.
In 1982–1990, the empirical results for banking crises do not support the
theoretical predictions. In particular, there was no increase in exports dur-
ing banking crises. Perhaps the theoretical predictions were inappropriate
for this period because many developing countries stopped repaying for-
eign debts when they struggled with the ﬁnancial crises. Furthermore, the
amount of foreign capital ﬂow into less-developed economies was rela-
tively modest.
The empirical results for 1991–1998 were broadly consistent with theo-
retical predictions. The negative longer-term eﬀect of banking crises on im-
ports is as predicted. Although the theories predict the short-term eﬀect on
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Table 8.5 The eﬀects of banking crisis on trade
Theoretical prediction
Empirical results Foreign Investment  Aggregate 
Income capital  ﬂow  demand  eﬀects (except 
channel channel channel income channel) 1982–1990 1991–1998
Imports (short) – ? ? –
Imports (longer) – – – ? –
Exports (short) –    ?  
Exports (longer) – –   ?? –
Notes: Dash   negative; plus sign   positive; question mark   unclear or insigniﬁcant.
Table 8.6 The eﬀects of currency crisis on trade
Theoretical prediction
Empirical results Market Substitution  Aggregate 
chaos Income  eﬀect Wealth  eﬀects (except 
channel channel channel channel income channel) 1982–1990 1991–1998
Imports (short) – – – –
Imports (longer) – – – – – –
Exports (short) – – – ?
Exports (longer) – –   ?– a  
Notes: See table 8.5 notes.
aThe accumulated eﬀect was negative but tended to increase.imports to be insigniﬁcant, the empirical negative impact on imports dur-
ing crisis years may be due to the use of annual data (as opposed to quar-
terly or monthly data), which might have been inﬂuenced by the longer-
term eﬀects. The positive impact on exports in the short term is consistent
with the theoretical prediction about the eﬀect of capital outﬂow. The re-
sults that exports decreased in the longer term (the second year after crisis)
implies that the negative eﬀect via the capital ﬂow channel overwhelmed
the positive eﬀect through the investment demand channel.
Theoretical analysis predicts that currency crises had negative impact on
imports both in the short term (due to market chaos) and the longer term
(due to wealth loss plus substitution eﬀect if crisis was triggered by exter-
nal shocks). The short-term eﬀect on exports are negative, but the longer-
term eﬀect was ambiguous because the positive eﬀect via the wealth chan-
nel ran counter to the negative eﬀect via the substitution eﬀect if the crisis
was triggered by external shocks.
Comparing the empirical results of currency crises with the theoretical
predictions, we discover three phenomena. First, consistent with theoreti-
cal predictions, the impact of currency crises on imports were negative in
both the short term and the longer term. Second, the short-term eﬀect via
the market chaos channel in 1991–1998 was weaker than that in 1982–1990,
so exports decreased signiﬁcantly in crisis years in 1982–1990 but did not
change signiﬁcantly in 1991–1998. Third, in 1982–1990, exports after the
crisis recovered but still remained below the original level. We are not cer-
tain whether it was due to a weakening of the short-term eﬀect or if the
longer-term eﬀect had kicked in. In contrast, in 1991–1998, exports in-
creased signiﬁcantly after currency crises, implying that the impact via the
wealth channel overwhelmed the impact through the substitution eﬀect
channel. Generally, the empirical results in both periods are broadly con-
sistent with theoretical predictions.
8.6.3 Twin Crises, Successful and Unsuccessful Crises
Let us check for the eﬀects of twin crises by adding a twin crisis dummy,
tct   bit   cit, and its ﬁrst and second lags. Clearly tcit   1 if and only if
both bit and cit are equal to 1.
The estimation results are listed in table 8.7. Most coeﬃcients of the twin
crisis dummy variables are insigniﬁcant even though the values of the co-
eﬃcients are not small in relative terms.
As we pointed out previously, currency crises may be “successful” or
“unsuccessful.” Because currency devaluations did not occur in unsuc-
cessful currency crises, their impact could be diﬀerent from that of suc-
cessful crises. We separate the currency crisis dummies into two more re-
ﬁned groups of variables: sc stands for a successful currency crisis (i.e.,
both currency crisis and devaluation happen); fc stands for an unsuccess-
ful currency crisis (i.e., a currency crisis without devaluation). The results
276 Zihui Ma and Leonard K. ChengTable 8.7 Estimation results with twin crisis dummies
1982–1990 1991–1998
















































(continued)are reported in table 8.8. Because most currency crises were successful, it is
not surprising that the coeﬃcients of sc are close to those of c in table 8.4.
We ﬁnd that the longer-term eﬀects of unsuccessful currency crises were
unclear: almost all coeﬃcients of lagfc and lag2fc are insigniﬁcant. How-
ever, the short-term eﬀects of unsuccessful crises in the two periods were
diﬀerent. In 1982–1990, imports did not change signiﬁcantly, but exports
decreased signiﬁcantly after an unsuccessful currency crisis. However, in
1991–1998, an unsuccessful currency had negative eﬀects on imports but
positive eﬀects on exports. Most of the other coeﬃcients were not aﬀected
by the separation into two diﬀerent currency crisis variables.
8.6.4 How Large are the Eﬀects on Trade?
Because the variables are expressed in logarithmic terms, we can com-
pute the size of the eﬀects from the regression results contained in tables
8.5 and 8.6 and by using the impulse response functions in ﬁgures 8.9, 8.10,
8.11, and 8.12. In 1991–1998, a country’s imports on average would decline
by about 9.7 percent during the year in which a banking crisis occurred, by

























∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Table 8.8 Estimation results with both “successful” and “unsuccessful” currency
crisis dummies
1982–1990 1991–1998














































(continued)13 percent in the ﬁrst year after crises, by 14.5 percent in the subsequent
year; exports would increase by about 8.8 percent during the crisis year, by
5 percent in the ﬁrst year after crisis, but would decrease by 2 percent in the
second year after crisis. The country’s imports would drop by about 4.3
percent during the year in which a successful currency crisis occurred, by
9.7 percent and 12.4 percent in the subsequent two years, respectively; ex-
ports would increase by about 0.5 percent (insigniﬁcant) during the crisis
year, by about 5 percent and 9 percent in the two subsequent years after
crises, respectively. The results show that the impact of ﬁnancial crises on
international trade was very strong.
8.7 Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
We have analyzed how ﬁnancial crises aﬀected international trade in the
last two decades, an important question largely ignored by the literature.
Our theoretical analysis predicts that imports will decrease during and af-



























∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.ter a banking crisis, whereas exports will rise during but fall after the crisis.
Theoretical analysis predicts imports and exports will fall during currency
crises, but the eﬀect after the crisis depends on the source of external
shocks. By estimating a model of bilateral trade between ﬁfty countries
over a period of nineteen years with real-world data, we have found that the
empirical results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions,
especially in 1991–1998. The empirical results also show that after cur-
rency crises exports increased more signiﬁcantly in 1991–1998 than in
1982–1990. That may be a clue of “contagious crisis” in the last decade.
This paper has focused on the value of trade, but an alternative measure
would be the volume of trade. In addition, the impact of ﬁnancial crises on
diﬀerent tradable goods may be diﬀerent. It would be interesting to explore
whether the relationships between trade and ﬁnancial crisis varied system-
atically across diﬀerent products. For instance, products that enjoyed a com-
parative advantage versus those that suﬀered a comparative disadvantage.
Another possible direction for future research is the eﬀects of economic
structures and government policies on trade. We found that the impact of ﬁ-
nancial crises was diﬀerent between the 1980s and 1990s. Whether and how
much of this diﬀerence was attributable to diﬀerences in economic struc-
tures and government policies seems to be a worthwhile topic to explore.
References
Baig, Taimur, and Ilan Goldfajn. 1998. Financial market contagion in the Asian
crisis. International Monetary Fund Working Paper no. WP/98/155. Washing-
ton, DC: IMF, November.
Calvo, Guillermo A., and Carmen M. Reinhart. 1999. When capital inﬂows come
to a sudden stop: Consequences and policy options. Working Paper, June.
Diamond, Douglas W., and Philip H. Dybvig. 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance,
and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91:401–19.
Eichengreen, Barry, and Michael D. Bordo. 2002. Crises now and then: What les-
sons from the last era of ﬁnancial globalization? NBER Working Paper no. 8716.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Eichengreen, Barry, and Andrew K. Rose. 1999. Contagious currency crises: Chan-
nels of conveyance. In Changes in exchange rates in rapidly developing countries:
Theory, practice, and policy issues, ed. Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, 29–
50. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Eichengreen, Barry, Andrew K. Rose, and Charles Wyplosz. 1996. Contagious cur-
rency crises. NBER Working Paper no. 5681. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau
of Economic Research, July.
Frankel, Jeﬀrey, and Andrew K. Rose. 2002. An estimate of the eﬀect of currency
unions on trade and income. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2): 437–66.
Forbes, Kristin. 2000. The Asian ﬂu and Russian virus: Firm level evidence on how
crises are transmitted internationally. NBER Working Paper no. 7807. Cam-
bridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July.
The Eﬀects of Financial Crises on International Trade 281———. 2001. Are trade linkages important determinants of country vulnerability
to crises? NBER Working Paper no. 8194. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research, March.
Glick, Reuven, and Andrew K. Rose. 1999. Contagion and trade: Why are currency
crises regional? Journal of International Money and Finance 18:603–17.
Kaminsky, Graciela L., and Carmen M. Reinhart. 1999. The twin crises: The
causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems. American Economic Re-
view 89:473–500.
Krugman, Paul. 1979. A model of balance of payments crises. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 11:311–25.
Masson, Paul. 1998. Contagion: Monsoonal eﬀects, spillovers, and jumps between
multiple equilibria. International Monetary Fund Working Paper no. WP/98/
142. Washington, DC: IMF, September.
Mendoza, Enrique G. 2001. Credit, prices, and crashes: Business cycles with a sud-
den stop. NBER Working Paper no. 8338. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research, June.
Obstfeld, Maurice. 1996. Models of currency crises with self-fulﬁlling features. Eu-
ropean Economic Review 40:1037–47.
Comment Chin Hee Hahn
It has been recognized in the previous literature that ﬁnancial crises have a
“contagious eﬀect.” While the focus of several preceding studies was on
whether trade linkage plays a role in transmitting crises across countries,
this paper examines more closely how ﬁnancial crises aﬀect exports and
imports. Insofar as understanding the eﬀects of ﬁnancial crises on trade
ﬂows is complementary to understanding the role of trade in transmitting
crises, this paper raises a very important question. To address this ques-
tion, this paper provides an outline of the theoretical framework as well as
an empirical analysis. I think this paper is a serious attempt to add to the
literature on the eﬀects and transmission of ﬁnancial crises.
Nevertheless, the speciﬁcation of the regressions doesn’t seem to allow
us to interpret the empirical results clearly. Because the basic regression
model includes gross domestic product (GDP) and devaluation variables,
the estimated coeﬃcients on crisis dummy variables and, hence, the im-
pulse responses of trade ﬂows to crises would capture the eﬀect of crises on
trade that is not captured by changes in the GDP or the exchange rate.
However, ﬁnancial crises are likely to aﬀect trade mostly by aﬀecting the
GDP or the exchange rate. The theoretical framework in this paper also
suggests that this is likely to be the case. Then, what interpretation we can
give to the coeﬃcients on crisis variables and, hence, to the impulse re-
sponses, seems to be somewhat unclear. For example, if there is less foreign
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Chin Hee Hahn is a research fellow of the Korea Development Institute.capital inﬂow after a banking crisis to ﬁnance domestic investment proj-
ects, then it is likely to aﬀect the GDP or the exchange rate or both, at least
in the short term. Then, the estimated eﬀect of a banking crisis on trade,
controlling for the GDP and changes in the exchange rate, is likely to cap-
ture those eﬀects of the banking crisis that is not associated with changes
in the GDP or the exchange rate. At least, the theoretical framework in this
paper does not tell us clearly what these eﬀects are. Viewed from this per-
spective, the estimated magnitudes of the eﬀects of crises on trade ﬂows
seem to be very large. For example, a banking crisis reduces imports by
about 12 percent during the crisis year, and by about 20 percent cumula-
tively during the three-year period after the crisis, with these eﬀects not as-
sociated with changes in the GDP or the exchange rate.
Comment Kozo Kiyota
This paper examines the impacts of banking and ﬁnancial crises on inter-
national trade both theoretically and empirically. Hypotheses drawn from
the theoretical analyses are in table 8C.1. The aggregated eﬀects ofa bank-
ing crisis on exports (except income channel) are positive in the short term
while those on imports are negative in the long term. On the other hand, all
aggregated impacts of currency crises on international trade except long-
term exports are negative.
To  test these hypotheses, the authors estimated a gravity model with
banking and currency crises dummies, using data for ﬁfty countries from
1982 to 1998. As table 8C.1 shows, the empirical analysis generally sup-
ports the theoretical prediction. The short-run impacts of currency crises
on exports are positive for the period 1982–1990. On the other hand, for
the period 1991–1998, currency crises had negative impacts on imports in
the short and long terms. In addition, the analysis conﬁrmed that banking
crises had negative impacts on imports in the short term but positive im-
pacts on exports in the long term. The authors also examined the scale of
these impacts on international trade using an impulse-response function
and found that these impacts were signiﬁcantly strong.
The question addressed in this paper is one of the most important issues
in analyzing the impacts of ﬁnancial crises. The paper has three important
ﬁndings. First, the channels and impacts of banking crises on international
trade are diﬀerent from those of currency crises. Second, the impacts of the
crises are diﬀerent between the short and long terms. Finally, the impacts
of crises are diﬀerent between the 1980s and the 1990s. This is an excellent
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National University.paper with important policy implications. However, there is some room for
improvement, which is summarized as follows.
1. In the currency crises model, the diﬀerent impacts between short and
long terms are not very clear. For instance, why does the income channel
work only for the long term in a currency crisis while it works for both the
short and long term in a banking crisis? Because the diﬀerent impacts be-
tween the short and long terms is one of the important ﬁndings of this pa-
per, further explanation of the diﬀerence would be helpful.
2. The authors investigate the eﬀects of twin crises. However, they oﬀer
no explanation about the interaction between banking and currency crises
in their theoretical analysis. Therefore, the expected impacts of twin crises
are not clear. The empirical analysis employs a dummy variable that is de-
ﬁned as the cross term of banking and ﬁnancial crises dummies. This is also
284 Zihui Ma and Leonard K. Cheng
Table 8C.1 The eﬀects of banking and currency crises on trade: Theoretical prediction and
empirical results
The eﬀects of banking crises on trade
Theoretical prediction
Empirical results Foreign Investment  Aggregate 
Income capital  ﬂow  demand  eﬀects (except 
channel channel channel income channel) 1982–1990 1991–1998
Imports
Short term – ? ? –
Long term – – ? –a
Exports
Short term –    ?  a
Long term – –   ?? –
The eﬀects of currency crises on trade
Theoretical prediction
Empirical results Market Substitution  Aggregate 
chaos Income  eﬀect Wealth  eﬀects (except 
channel channel channel channel income channel) 1982–1990 1991–1998
Imports
Short term – – –a –a
Long term – – – – –a –a
Exports
Short term – – –a –a
Long term – –   ?–  
Sources: Tables 8.5 and 8.6.
Notes: Dash   negative; plus sign   positive; question mark   unclear or insigniﬁcant.
aEmpirical results support theoretical prediction.diﬃcult to interpret because the cross term can reﬂect several combina-
tions of the impacts (for instance, positive signs are obtained whenever the
impacts of two crises are the same despite each coeﬃcient of crises being
positive or negative). Similarly, the authors do not provide any explanation
about the expected impacts of “successful” and “unsuccessful” crises.
This, in turn, implies that it is hard to interpret the estimation results. The
authors could therefore provide some discussion of the expected eﬀects of
twin crises and “successful” and “unsuccessful” crises in their theoretical
section.
3. The authors should provide more information about their empirical
methodology. It is not clear whether their regression analysis employed a
panel-data method such as a random-eﬀect model. Further, the authors
should present such basic indicators as the mean, variance, and correlation
matrix of the variables. Such information could help to determine if some
of the insigniﬁcant results might be caused by an inappropriate estimation
method, speciﬁcation error, or multicollinearity of independent variables.
4. This paper uses annual data in the empirical analysis. However, bank-
ing and currency crises may occur rapidly. Therefore, annual data might
not capture some of the important impacts on international trade. If data
are available, quarterly or monthly data would be more appropriate to cap-
ture the impacts of the crises.
5. The authors found that the impact of ﬁnancial crises was diﬀerent be-
tween the 1980s and 1990s. This is an interesting ﬁnding. More useful in-
formation could be obtained if the authors reported table 8.1 separately for
the 1980s and the 1990s. That is, were the same countries aﬀected in both
the 1980s and the 1990s, or did countries face changes after 1990? Simple
modiﬁcation of table 8.1 might provide much helpful information.
6. There are several extensions of the research that could be pursued, in-
cluding the impacts of ﬁnancial crises on comparative advantage, intrare-
gional trade, intraindustry trade, and intraﬁrm trade. Among these topics,
the eﬀects of banking and ﬁnancial crises on intraregional trade could be
an especially interesting topic. Because ﬁnancial crises tend to be regional
(Glick and Rose 1999), such analysis might also reveal the diﬀerent im-
pacts between banking and ﬁnancial crises.
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